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The spacecraft launched by NASA on
November 3, 1973 to explore Venus and Mer-
cury proved a notable success as a develop-
ment project both in space and on the ground.
This article on the development points out
management approaches and techniques
that kept schedules and controlled costs, the
intent being to stimulate thought about how
to do the same with future spacecraft and
payloads.
The Mariner Venus/Mercury '73 (MVM '73)
project kept within its originally established
goals for schedule, performance and cost. Un-
derlying this development success was the
availability of the Mariner technology. But
meeting the goals demanded management
determination, planning and discipline to
make optimum use of state-of-the-art
technology--on the part of people at NASA,
JPL and The Boeing Co. (the contractor).
Pre-project Highlights
The earliest studies of the concept and scien-
tific potential of a Venus/Mercury swing-by
mission drew many to observe it could be the
unique mission of the decade. It was the first
to use a gravity-assist technique--taking ad-
vantage of an unusual planetary configura-
tion existing in 1973. Using the gravitation-
al field of Venus, it was possible to swing an
Atlas-Centaur-launched spacecraft onto a
flight path to Mercury. Exploration of Mer-
cury otherwise would not have been possible
without using a much larger launch vehicle.
The 1968 Planetary Exploration Summer
Study conducted by the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) Space Science Board (SSB)
endorsed this mission. The SSB suggested
that the mission be planned around a single
launch to make best use of the science funds
available to NASA.
Mission Objectives
The following mission objectives, established
by NASA following the Summer Study in
1968, did not change during the program's
several years of design and development:
Primary. During the 1973 opportunity,
to conduct exploratory investigations of
the planet Mercury's environment, atmo-
sphere, surface, and body characteristics
and to obtain environmental and atmo-
spheric data from Venus during the fly-
by. First priority goes to Mercury inves-
tigations.
Secondary. To perform interplanetary
experiments while the spacecraft flies
from Earth to Mercury, and to obtain ex-
perience with a gravity-assist mission.
JPL had long experience with planetary pro-
grams, but the opportunity for other Centers
to participate in the program was not fore-
closed. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center
(GSFC) had plans for a Planetary Explorer
spacecraft potentially able to do the mission
and its approach was sufficiently attractive
to invite further study. During the remain-
der of 1968 and 1969, both GSFC and JPL
studied their respective concepts; this early
competition contributed to thoroughness of
the early planning effort.
The Scientists
An innovative technique was used on MVM
'73 to assure early involvement of the scienti-
fic community with mission definition and
preliminary design. In past missions, no ef-
fective mechanism for the early detailed
planning involvement of outside scientists
had evolved, and selection of principal inves-
tigators had been withheld until the comple-
tion of mission-profile studies and early sys-
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tem determinations. By the time the investi-
gators were selected in those programs,
many design features had already been es-
tablished.
For MVM '73, selected scientists were invit-
ed to participate in the early mission plan-
ning. A group of scientists representing the
several disciplines to be involved in the sci-
ence payload was selected and formed into a
Science Steering Group (SSG) in September
1969. The scientists influenced the early mis-
sion and spacecraft design, holding to a mini-
mum conflict between mission constraints
and science needs.
Based on the positive results from these
planning efforts,MVM '73 was presented in
the FY70 NASA budget as an Office ofSpace
Science and Applications (OSSA) "new start"
at a funding level of $3 million. An Authori-
zation Conference Committee approved the
project for inclusion in the FY70 authoriza-
tion action, and funds were appropriated as
requested. The scientificprincipal investiga-
tors were then selected in a normal fashion
afterprojectauthorization.
Robert S. Kraemer, then head of planetary
planning at NASA, pressed innovation in the
early planning of MVM '73. Kraemer later
moved to the post of planetary program di-
rector, with responsibility for implementing
the project.
The "Low Cost" Attitude
The "low cost" attitude, so evident in the
management of MVM '73, developed early.
The study teams were instructed to consider
maximum use of established designs, residu-
al hardware and existing capabilities. Very
strict financial constraints were factored into
payload planning. The SSG was requested to
consider minimum cost experiments that
would yield acceptable scientific data. The
potential experiment proposers were advised
to use existing designs for science instru-
ments, to use flight-tested experiments
wherever possible, and to consider modifica-
tions only for high-payoff options. They were
also to limit quality assurance, reliability
and documentation requirements to that pre-
viously applied to prior successful similar in-
struments. GSFC and JPL established the
mission and spacecraft baseline, developed
preliminary implementation plans incorpo-
rating the experiment approach being fol-
lowed by the SSG, and made early cost esti-
mates. JPL called on its extensive experience
with Mariner spacecraft. Goddard proposed a
spin-stabilized spacecraft of the Explorer
class.
JPL proposed to commit to a fixed cost to do
the MVM '73 mission in the system-contract
mode. W.H. Pickering, JPL Director, advised
OSSA in December 1969 that JPL could and
would undertake the project for a cost not to
exceed $98 million.
The JPL Goal
After a full briefing on the approaches by
GSFC and JPL (proposed science return,
spacecraft configurations, management
modes, manpower and cost projections),
OSSA chose JPL. In a letter to Dr. Pickering,
assigning project management to JPL, John
E. Naugle, Associate Administrator for
Space Science, made this comment regarding
mission cost: "A major concern has been and
remains to be the total runout cost of the pro-
ject. I am sure you are aware of the cost histo-
ry for which estimates have ranged from ap-
proximately $70 million to well over $100
million. It is mandatory that the project be
accomplished for a total cost not exceeding
the $98 million quoted in your letter and
strong efforts should be taken to reduce this
figure." This letter set the fundamental cost
understanding between OSSA and JPL.
The "Work Package" Concept
JPL expertise in conducting flight projects
predominantly involved obtaining spacecraft
subsystems from industry thorough the JPL
technical divisions with JPL accomplishing
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the spacecraft systems functions. The major
challenge faced by JPL in the MVM '73 pro-
ject was to utilize and adapt the fundamental
JPL strengths to a system-contracting mode.
A JPL team suggested a "work package" con-
cept as the best means to transition from the
use of subsystem contractors to a systems
contractor. Appropriate elements of the JPL
matrix organization prepared the work pack-
ages. The project office exercised system
technical direction, but the detailed defini-
tion, monitoring and control of individual
work units was performed by the appropriate
JPL organizational element under the over-
all coordination of the JPL project office.
JPL also determined other factors important
to implementing the project. It selected a cost
contract with award fee. A specific JPL pro-
curement group co-located with the project
office would administer the system contract
and other MVM '73-related ones. It was de-
cided that the JPL inhouse tasks should be
given as much visibility and control as those
of the system contractor. The constraint on
resources dictated that all elements of the
project, regardless of the performing organi-
zation, be monitored in the same detail, and
the risks balanced across all portions of the
project's activities.
PAD, Procedures and Payoff
The NASA project approval process entails a
basic contract or understanding between the
Administrator and the responsible Program
Associate Administrator known as the Pro-
gram Authorization Document (PAD). The
initial PAD for the MVM '73 project was
signed on February 27, 1970. The objectives,
technical plan, major support interfaces and
procurement approach discussed in that PAD
remained unchanged throughout the devel-
opment.
The JPL approach strongly exercised the
Mariner heritage. MVM '73 benefited not
only from Mariner design derivation but also
from residual hardware from past programs.
The plan emphasized maximum use of exist-
ing designs, hardware and software. This ap-
proach saved perhaps 50 percent of design
and development costs and perhaps 15 per-
cent in hardware costs--a big payoff.
The Cutting Edge
The project team had lengthy discussions
with JPL implementing organizations to
identify the optimum way to meet cost con-
straints. Control of cost-at-completion be-
came a basic concept stressed by both the
JPL and Headquarters offices in an attempt
to avoid the less efficient, year-by-year fun-
ding controls often followed in projects. The
MVM '73 project made it clear that each as-
signed work unit was the total responsibility
of the cognizant division and that responsi-
bility for determining the least costly way to
do the work rested squarely with the divi-
sion. For each potential increase in cost,
something had to be cut back. The JPL divi-
sions almost invariably proposed specific
cuts concurrent with notification to the pro-
ject office of potential cost increases.
Schedule Strategy
The schedule adopted for MVM '73 provided
an unusually long period for advanced plan-
ning and deferred this start of major con-
tracts. This approach, unprecedented in
launch-critical planetary programs, may
have been the single most important factor
in meeting cost goals.
The added risk to the mission was offset by
the increase in design time and better plan-
ning of the fabrication effort. The effect was
to establish a "most cost-effective" approach.
The greatest number of people worked on the
project for the shortest period of time. (Axi-
om: the shorter the schedule, the less the
cost.)
Once adopted as a project philosophy, delay
in implementation was applied to all aspects
of the project.The systems contract was de-
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layed three months beyond the schedule con-
sidered minimal by many. Other subcontract
work was released on a schedule that limited
the work time toa prudent minimum. A "sin-
gle thread" approach was followed in the
spacecraft design where options were stud-
ied, one was adopted, and the work started
without carrying parallel efforts.Mission op-
erations work was held offbeyond the sched-
ule previously considered to be optimum.
Flight operations crew training was held off
as long as possible. And it worked! There
were no major schedule slippages, no serious-
ly late deliveries of equipment and no ex-
traordinary workarounds.
"Do Only the Essential"
The philosophy of "Do Only the Essential"
became a discipline among project partici-
pants. To challenge the need for each opera-
tion, each added procedure, each piece of spe-
cial equipment, and each separate design, re-
dundant feature or test became routine. If a
function, part, or operation was determined
to be needed, then the search went on to see if
hardware was available from other projects,
or if the process had been developed by some-
one else. If the part or process was not avail-
able, then there was an attempt to use avail-
able designs.
This discipline was not only applied by the
JPL managers but by Boeing as well. The
Boeing spacecraft program manager proved
extremely resourceful in identifying short
cuts, reductions in paperwork, and unneces-
Salt redundancy--the cost-type contract not
withstanding. The listofhardware and effort
saved through thiseffortistoo lengthy to dis-
cuss here, but the savings extended to every
area of the project effort.
One unusual saving is notable. The project
team encouraged a local college, assisted by
several other colleges and high schools, to
produce the spacecraft models, which often
cost more than $100,000. The project gained
all the models required, the students and
schools gained good experience from their
work on an interestingtask and NASA saved
dollars and encouraged local community in-
terestand support.
Project Team
The most important ingredients to project
success were the attitudes and skills of the
people assigned to manage it. JPL's exper-
ience in dealing with a system contractor
was limited to Surveyor, and by 1970 rela-
tively few JPL people had been involved in
the early stages of that project. The person
most familiar with its operations was Walker
E. "Gene" Giberson, who had been Survey-
or's project manager. He was appointed
MVM '73 project manager in January 1970.
Giberson assembled a small team of indi-
viduals, each selected on the basis of his past
project experience and his willingness to
work within firm budget allocations.The key
members of this team included V. C. Clarke,
Jr., mission analysis and engineering man-
ager; J.A. Dunne, project scientist;J.R.
Casani, spacecraft system manager; J.N.
Wilson, assistant spacecraft system manager
and N. Sirri,mission operation system man-
ager. This team, trim in sizeyet representing
broad experience, represented the core of
MVM '73projectmanagement.
The Guidelines
At first, the team spent considerable time de-
veloping the project's operating concepts and
indoctrinating everyone involved with the
organizational and project philosophy. They
set and held to the following guidelines
throughout the project:
• Establish early project guidelines, objec-
tivesand constraints
• Use a small staff for planning
Prepare detailed plans and tasks before
initiatinga contract:
- Specificand detailed RFPs
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- A careful tradeoff assessment between
JPL and contractor furnished equip-
ment
- Use of existing documents, reports and
systems
- Careful selection of fee approach
• Establish cost-at-completion planning,
budgeting and emphasis
• Secure all contracts before starting work
• Keepwork and budget plans up-to-date
• Exercise organizational impedance
matching and communications
• Maximize technical interaction
• Use the concept of cognizant work unit
engineer
• Hold frequent face-to-face meetings of op-
erating managers
• Identify and resolve problems promptly
• Make periodic status and performance re-
views
Indoctrinate allinvolved with costgoals
- Instillcost consciousness
- Make costgoals believable
- Develop a clear understanding of the
cost-controlsystem
• Bring manpower onto the project and
move it off in a timely manner
The Hot Seat
The Headquarters Program Office/Center
Project Office interface can be extremely
critical to the success of a project. If the pro-
gram manager and project manager have dif-
fering ambitions and objectives or, as oc-
curred in some instances, an adversarial re-
lationship, the project can suffer. N. William
Cunningham, the Headquarters program
manager, and Gene Giberson, the JPL pro-
ject manager, enjoyed an open and forthright
relationship, a cornerstone of a sound man-
agement structure.
The person on the "hot seat" for cost manage-
ment is, however, the project manager. The
project manager is the one most responsible
for establishing the attitude and the frame-
work for the daily tradeoffs of cost, perfor-
mance and schedule where it is most essen-
tial to maintain a proper perspective. With-
out his cost consciousness, his basic approach
to costs, MVM '73 would not have enjoyed its
obvious cost success. This cost attitude is the
more unusual since NASA had previously
stressed technical performance and schedule
requirements over cost as a discipline.
The Science Steering Group selected in Sept-
ember 1969 held its final meeting in March
1970. In its report, the SSG recommended a
minimum science payload composed of a
plasma science experiment, a magnetometer,
an infrared radiometer, an ultraviolet spec-
trometer, a television system and an energet-
ic particles experiment.
One of the tasks of the SSG was to make a de-
tailed cost estimate for each potential
experimentmincluding design, development
and fabrication costs of the hardware, cost of
personnel support for launch and mission op-
erations, and cost of data analysis and inter-
pretation and publication of results. These
cost estimates, plus a project estimate for in-
tegrating the instruments into the space-
craft, shaped the first science budget for the
project at $13 million.
An Announcement of Flight Opportunity
(AFO) issued in March 1970 invited propos-
als for experiments. It stressed the intent to
select only proven flight-qualified instru-
ments. The AFO also stressed the desire to
minimize documentation and stated the in-
tent of JPL to monitor development of the in-
struments only at the interface level.
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Forty-six proposals were received and evalu-
ated. After ranking them in terms of science
excellence, technical and engineering re-
quirements, cost and system integration, the
program office recommended seven payloads
to the OSSA Associate Administrator. The
payload cost estimates went as follows (in
millions of dollars):
Television $6.226M
Radio science 0.500
Ultraviolet 0.575
Infrared 0.928
Magnetometer 0.688
Energetic particles 0.383
Plasma science 0.945
Total $10.245
Instrument integration 2.355
Total $12.600
To each of the principal investigators select-
ed, Dr. Naugle addressed this comment: "I
must emphasize, once again, that the total
negotiated figure (dollar cost as selected)
cannot be exceeded. Accordingly, I have in-
structed the JPL project office that in the
event of an anticipated cost overrun, their al-
ternatives will consist of helping you to re-
duce the scope of your experiment, or recom-
mending its termination."
Science and Dollars
Whereas most past selections had been con-
sidered final at the time of announcement,
the letterfrom Dr. Naugle clearly showed
that the selectionwas to be considered tenta-
tiveuntil the investigators and JPL complet-
ed negotiations. A process offact-findingand
negotiation between JPL and each of the sci-
entificinvestigators followed, which resulted
in well-defined relationships before the ma-
jor development effortcommenced.
Itwas made clear in the selectionand negoti-
ation process that the principal investigator
was responsible for the implementation and
development of the investigation, including
the instrument. The project officefollowed
through on the intent to control principally
at the instrument/spacecraft interface level.
The systems contractor was responsible for
integration of the instruments into the
spacecraft. One innovative technique re-
quired the systems contractor to "sign off"on
changes to experiment interface drawings,
although the contracts for the experiments
were between JPL and the investigator.This
technique provided greater assurance that
the systems contractor was aware of the
latestconfiguration of the experiment hard-
ware, and helped avoid surprises at the time
ofintegration.
Dr. Naugle views MVM '73 as the most suc-
cessful development of scientific instruments
within tight cost constraints. The addition of
the experiment integration costs to delivered
cost brings the total for science very close to
but within the original budget of $13 million.
Meeting payload cost goals begs the question
whether controls compromised the science
investigations.A detailed review of the de-
velopment history of each instrument clearly
demonstrated that not only was there no
compromise of the investigations during de-
velopment, but that significant capability
was added to several investigations.Any sci-
ence compromise on MVM '73 reflectsdirect-
ly the original constraints established before
experiments were selected.The decisions to
tightly constrain payload costs, to fly only
proven instruments and to apply go/no-go
cost restrictionson instrument development
are serious policy decisions to be carefully
weighed. They cannot be applied to every
payload but they paid offin MVM '73.
NASA and JPL held an industry briefing in
February 1970 to apprise companies of the
goals and constraints of the MVM '73, to pro-
vide detailed technical and program informa-
tion for early planning, to encourage compe-
tition, and to enlist industry's help in deter-
mining an optimum role for a system con-
tractor; 41 firms attended the briefing.
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JPL asked the companies for suggestions re-
garding implementation of the systems con-
tract approach; separate day-long meetings
were held with the most interested competi-
tors to discuss their suggestions. During
these meetings, the companies made recom-
mendations on contract scope,roles and rela-
tionships, Mariner technology transfer,con-
tract type, GFP handling and other areas
they believed were important to the effort.
A procurement plan evolved in which the
systems contractor would have the major role
(1) to design, fabricate, assemble, and test
one flight spacecraft, one test spacecraft, as-
sociated test models, test and support equip-
ment and appropriate spares; and (2) to pro-
vide level-of-effort support to JPL in mission
analysis and engineering, JPL subsystems
activities and mission operations.
RFP Features
The JPL project definition effort had been
proceeding for a year at the time the Request
for Proposals (RFP) was issued. The result of
that effort was a very detailed RFP. It was an
extensive compendium explaining project ob-
jectives, organization and implementation;
schedule, control dates and documents; work
breakdown structure; spacecraft design sum-
mary; scope of contract and general descrip-
tion of work; JPL/contractor relationships
and mission operations. Its most unusual fea-
tures included:
A spacecraft systems specification which
attempted to state only minimum re-
quirements.
The predetermined intent to divide all
work into discreet work units (which al-
lowed separation of responsibilities and
facilitated work description, understand-
ing, negotiation and JPL monitoring).
The definition of each work unit was writ-
ten in a standard format.
• The request for firms to propose overhead
cost ceilings.
The request for baseline and alternate
cost proposals to get the best cost mix be-
tween JPL and contractor-furnished
equipment.
A call for incentive proposals which gave
heavy emphasis to cost, but also stated
strong preference to award fee.
Emphasis on minimum documentation
and maximum use of procedures, forms,
techniques, etc. the contractor currently
used.
Detailed documentation covering Mari-
ner '69 hardware, Mariner '71 hardware,
and other JPL-furnished equipment,
along with drawings, schematics, pro-
cesses and procedures to assure full use of
the Mariner heritage and facilitate cost
estimates.
Four proposals were received. The Source
Evaluation Board presentation was made to
the NASA Administrator on April 28, 1971,
and The Boeing Co. was selected as the sys-
tems contractor.
Category of
IndirectExpense
Engineering
Manufacturing
ProductiveMaterial
SubcontractMaterial
Area Administration
Group Administration (remote)
CY 1971
Negotiated Per
Contract Actual
$3.94
4.99
10.5%
6.1%
15.1%
9.6%
$3.74
5.08
7.9%
5.5%
14.35%
9.75%
CY1972
Negotiated Per
Contract Actual
$4.14
5.24
10.5%
6.1%
15.1%
9.6%
$3.88M
4.97
6.7%
3.6%
11.9%
7.8%
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Holding Out for a Firm Negotiated
Contract
The pressure to award the contract and com-
mence work was very strong following the
April selection, but the project manager and
contract manager held out for a firm negoti-
ated contract before allowing work to be
started. Within six and one half weeks after
selection,negotiations were completed and a
definitivecontract was awarded. Work start-
ed on June 17, 1971.
The cost-plus-award-fee contract emphasized
the contractor's complete responsibility to
meet the spacecraft system performance re-
quirements. The effortwas divided into work
units, each assigned to a manager within
The Boeing Co. The work units were com-
patible with both JPL's technical division or-
ganization and Boeing's projectstructure.
Controlling Overhead
A serious concern in systems contracting had
been the inability to predict overhead costs.
The parties agreed that a ceiling on overhead
costs would be negotiated into the contract.
Such ceilings on overhead are unusual in
normal circumstances, and all the more so in
this case, considering the depressed economic
situation The Boeing Co. faced in the spring
of 1971. The ceiling on overhead never was
invoked because Boeing actually underran
the negotiated overhead cost.
Strong cost incentives were negotiated into
the contract and a process for evaluation and
award emphasized performance and cost con-
trol.The award fee provisions and the system
employed to carry them out appear to have
been effectivein contributing to the contrac-
tor'sperformance. Benefits included these:
@ Boeing's spacecraft program manager
had the opportunity to increase the fee
significantly. The award fee structure al-
lowed broad latitude in the approach to
cost and performance tradeoffs.
The process enforced periodic, results-
oriented evaluations and communications
at all levels.The process and the resul-
tant dialogue tended to remove the obsta-
cles that stand in the way of the natural
motivation to do a good job. By clarifying
goals,establishing emphasis, eliminating
misunderstandings and highlighting
problem areas for mutual attention, ob-
stacleswere removed or reduced.
@ Attention of the contractor'stop manage-
ment was obtained by the formal feed-
back process (briefingssupported by let-
ters).
The disciplineofthe award fee evaluation
process improved JPL's internal commu-
nications at alllevels,including top man-
agement on the award fee review board.
Tight Control
JPL has a reputation in the industry for ag-
gressive contract management, often ex-
pressed as complaints of "too tight control"
by subcontractors. But the JPL system
proves effective in assuring performance.
In MVM '73,change orders were kept to a
minimum throughout the contract and were
negotiated into the contract promptly after
issuance. Project officepersonnel monitored
Boeing's work very closely. The work unit
breakdown made it possible for cognizant
JPL engineers to thoroughly understand the
job,follow itsprogress in detail and identify
potential problems early.
Early identification of problems coupled with
open, candid discussions among The Boeing
Co. and JPL managers were basic contribu-
tors to the success of the project. D.T. Gant,
contracts manager, L.V. Burden, financial
manager, and L.M. Bates, cost analyst, who
were collocated in the project office, effective-
ly kept the project managers alert to unex-
pected deviations.
144
A STRATEGY OF COST CONTROL FOR MARINER VENUS/MERCURY '73
The NASA Management Audit Office, not
noted for its approbative descriptions of
NASA operations, gave this appraisal: "In
our opinion, the JPL surveillance of the con-
tract,itsassignment of capable and motivat-
ed personnel to monitor the performance of
MVM '73 on a full-timebasis,and the appar-
ent stringent cost controls implemented by
The Boeing Co. before contract award, and
retained throughout the program, contribut-
ed to Boeing's successful cost performance
under MVM '73."
Good Communications
Stressed by the managers, good communica-
tions led to early anticipation and resolution
of issues and the timely availability of data
for decision-making. Some of the techniques
used to assure communications included:
A weekly Agreement / Disagreement Log,
maintained by work unit personnel and
reviewed by the JPL spacecraft system
manager and The Boeing Co. spacecraft
program manager.
Weekly face-to-face meetings between the
systems contractor, systems manager and
the systems contractor program manager.
• A weekly summary of agreements and
formal tracking of action items.
Daily meetings between The Boeing Co.
test and operations representatives and
the JPL resident staff during the system
test period.
• Weekly "Problem TWX."
Formal monthly progress reviews to give
an overview and detailed status and plans
with particular emphasis on problems.
Easy access to The Boeing Co. and JPL
top management (above the level of pro-
ject personnel).
Attendance at award fee briefings by Boe-
ing's top management.
An extensive and definitive award fee let-
ter and briefing, held not later than 15
days after the end of each period.
Rapid escalation of significant problems
to the appropriate management level for
resolution.
None of these actions should surprise good
managers, but taken together, they may not
be commonplace. These combined techniques
greatly helped the MVM '73 project meet its
goals.
Highlights of Contractor Performance
The Boeing Co. faced an uncertain general
business position at the time the MVM '73
project contract was issued. Major reductions
had been made in Boeing's commercial air-
plane operations, and significant reductions
in employment had been made at Boeing
Aerospace Co.
Despite the drastic reduction in backlog and
direct workload, Boeing was able to reduce
overhead costs and even underrun the over-
head projections on the MVM '73. The aero-
space industry and its government customers
are conditioned to the increase of overhead
runs when the direct base decreases. This
"fact" is considered by many to be axiomatic
and inviolate; overhead costs are regarded as
"fixed" or unalterable and necessary to sup-
port the base for doing business. The exam-
ple of Boeing's experience in 1970 and 1971
could be a good case study in ways to reduce
overhead expense as the direct base de-
creases.
E.G. Czarnecki served as The Boeing Co.
MVM spacecraft program manager from the
early proposal phases in 1970 through early
1973. H. Kennet served as deputy program
manager and succeeded Czarnecki. Their
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participation contributed immensely to the
success of MVM '73. They have reviewed
their experience, and underscored these
management concepts and techniques em-
ployed on MVM '73:
• Spacecraft requirements must be defined
clearly and early.
• Match people (skills) to work unit tasks.
Use the "cognizant work unit engineer"
concept.
Select the baseline configuration early.
Implement a system of program reviews
and reporting with joint chairmanship by
contractor and customer.
Define and assess technical performance,
schedule and cost risks and develop work-
around plans.
Educate key personnel in the company's
cost accounting system so that when
tradeoffs and decisions are to be made, all
factors are properly considered and their
true impact on cost understood.
Shorten and improve communications
through collocation and program organi-
zation.
Establish organizational relationships
(e.g., JPL/Boeing) and communication
channels early.
Motivate people through performance as-
sessment, promotion, compensation and
achievement awards.
Emphasize cost trades during design.
• Ensure that only essentialwork isaccom-
plished.
• Use an objective performance measure-
ment system.
Rely on each cognizant work unit engi-
neer for early identification, reporting
and, when feasible, problem resolution.
• Use dedicated manufacturing and test fa-
cilities.
• On-load and off-load manpower in a time-
ly fashion.
Use recovery ("tiger") teams to work
problems. Teams of specialists from out-
side the program can be assigned prob-
lems and provide instant expertise with-
out a continued expense to the program.
A Postscript
The MVM '73 spacecraft (Mariner 10) was
launched on November 3, 1973. A number of
problems developed early in the flight, but
none degraded the mission and none was the
obvious result of actions taken to control
cost. The spacecraft reached Venus on Febru-
ary 5, 1974, and returned a full set of scienti-
fic data, including more than 4,000 pictures.
The gravitational attraction of Venus altered
the spacecraft's flight path as planned,
swinging it toward Mercury. The spacecraft
passed within 500 miles of Mercury's surface
on March 29, 1974, and returned the first
close scientific observations and pictures of
the planet.The project is currently [1974] an-
ticipating a modest underrun at completion.
So MVM '73 more than met its original per-
formance objectives and, in addition, served
to work out management approaches and
techniques to control costs.
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